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DO YOU TRUST ME? – GO FISH!* A STUDY ON TRUST AND FISHERIES 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Håkan Eggert, Mitesh Kataria, Elina Lampi
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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates trust among stakeholders in fisheries management. We asked the 
general public, environmental bureaucrats, and recreational and commercial fishers whether 
they believed various stakeholders have sufficient knowledge to take a stance regarding 
fisheries management issues in a choice experiment they themselves had just been exposed to. 
We found that the general public and recreational fishers tend to trust bureaucrats to have 
sufficient knowledge, while bureaucrats distrust the general public. The commercial fishers in 
our sample deviate from the other respondents with high self-trust and low trust in both the 
general public and bureaucrats. In addition, bureaucrats tend to think that their colleagues are 
more knowledgeable than them. When looking at observable characteristics, we find that, 
regardless of comparison group, males show higher trust in their own knowledge than do 
females, and those with higher education believe they are more knowledgeable than people in 
general. 
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1. Introduction 
Environmental problems are typically complex, uncertain, and affect various members of a 
society. One way to allow public influence on environmental policy and decision making (i.e., 
public participation) is to incorporate values held by those who are affected by the policy 
using cost-benefit analysis. There is, however, a considerable debate about whose preferences 
should be considered when measuring environmental benefits (Kontoleon et al., 2001). Some 
argue that everyone in society is entitled to influence policy, or at least that values for 
everyone affected by a policy should be taken into account (e.g., Kling et al., 2012), whereas 
others contend that experts alone should guide decision makers (e.g., Hausman, 2012).  
When it comes to fisheries, stakeholders who may or may not share views on how to 
manage a resource include recreational anglers, commercial fishers, bureaucrats working with 
environmental management, and the general public. Moreover, each of these groups may hold 
beliefs regarding whether members of the other groups have sufficient knowledge that entitles 
them to influence fisheries management. Our point of departure is to consider beliefs about 
others’ knowledge as attitudes that can be identified as trust. Thus, trust in one’s own and 
other stakeholders’ knowledge level is the focus of this study. More specifically, we analyze 
whether stakeholders in fisheries trust each other to have sufficient knowledge to choose 
between different options in a choice experiment (CE)
2
 study regarding fisheries 
management. We address this question by using data from a survey sent to the general public, 
recreational and commercial fishers, and bureaucrats at three government agencies 
responsible for environmental, water, and fisheries management, respectively. We are 
especially interested in analyzing whether the government agency representatives trust the 
general public to have sufficient knowledge and whether recreational and commercial fishers 
trust the authorities in the same respect.  
Trust between authorities and the members of a society is crucial in many aspects. 
Marien and Hooghe (2011) show that people with low levels of political trust are significantly 
more likely than people with high levels of political trust to accept illegal behavior such as tax 
fraud. Folke et al. (2005) claim that building trust is a major requisite for successful adaptive 
governance of social-ecological systems. Moreover, establishing the link between trust and 
knowledge, Metlay (1999) holds that institutional trust depends on beliefs about institutional 
behavior and on how competent an institution appears to be. Jentoft (1989) and Jonker and 
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 While there are several methods for estimating environmental benefits in a cost-benefit analysis, stated 
preference methods such as the contingent valuation method and the choice experiment (CE) method are among 
the more popular. 
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Treur (1999) discuss that trust develops over time and is based on previous experiences: 
Negative experiences will lower the level of trust while more positive experiences will 
increase the trust in an agent. According to Rova (2004), fishers tend to respect and follow 
their own self-imposed operational rules to a much greater extent than rules coming from 
authorities. Grafton (2005) points out that if fishers and regulators trust each other they are 
more likely to share knowledge and information with each other leading to lower regulation 
costs. Young (1979) contends that even if illegal fishing may be highly profitable, rule 
violations can be kept low if there is a norm of mutual trust among the individuals involved. 
De Vos and van Tatenhove (2011) point out that effective co-management by the fishing 
industry and authorities hinges on not only well-working institutions but also trust between 
the two camps. Nielsen (2003) claims that uncertainty and thereby management costs can be 
reduced by establishing mutual trust among the participants in the fisheries management 
decision-making process. Thus, increasing trust among fishers and between fishers and 
authorities implies economic advantages to society. While trust is necessary, it is of course 
not alone sufficient to make fishers comply with government regulations. Social norms and 
social capital are other important factors.
3
 (For a deeper discussion on how social capital 
influences fisheries governance, see Grafton, 2005). Clearly, the insight that institutional trust 
can increase compliance with government regulations and engagement in moral civic 
behavior is important in fisheries management. 
While the question of whether fishers trust bureaucrats to be knowledgeable enough to 
make decisions about fisheries management is inspired by the compliance literature that holds 
trust to be important for compliance, the question of whether bureaucrats trust the general 
public is more a question of bureaucrats’ perception of whose preferences should matter for 
environmental policies. Faber et al. (2002) found that German environmental bureaucrats do 
not solely obey the directives of their minister, i.e., the public interest as expressed by the 
representative democracy, but rather act as “political bureaucrats” who “develop their own 
political orientations and conceptions of justice and the common good, and act according to 
them.” A recent study asked the EPA administrators in Sweden whether, and if so who, 
should have more to say when deciding Swedish environmental policy. They were asked to 
choose from different interest and professional groups and from people who are especially 
affected by the environmental problem in question. The results show that about 60% of the 
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committees (McCay and Jentoft, 1996). This kind of co-operation in management between fishers and 
authorities could lead to a higher degree of converging norms and mutual understanding (Rova, 2004).  
 
 4 
EPA administrators think that people with environmental education (such as 
biologist/ecologists or environmental economists) should have a greater influence on the 
setting of priorities in environmental management. Only 12% of the respondents think that 
people who are especially affected by a certain environmental problem should have an 
increased influence on the related environmental policy making (Carlsson et al., 2011). 
However, it is not clear from this result whether bureaucrats distrust that people in general 
have sufficient knowledge to qualify them for participation in this kind of decision making. 
Glenn et al. (2012) investigated fishers’, fishers’ organizations’/representatives’, policy 
makers’, and scientists’ trust in the fisheries science community in five countries4. They found 
that trust in scientists differs across both countries and stakeholder groups, and that 
commercial fishers distrust scientists the most. The latter result is strongest in countries where 
the fishers and scientists have limited contact. 
The main contribution of this paper is that we attempt to quantify relative trust between 
different stakeholders, i.e., trust in own ability vs. the ability of others to take a stance on 
fisheries management issues. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done before. We 
then proceed to investigate how gender, education, and age may influence perception of own 
and others’ ability to take a stance on complex decisions. By using multiple-choice test of 
sports trivia Beyer and Bowden (1997) found significant gender differences in overconfidence 
in male-coded domains such as knowledge in football, baseball, and basketball, but not in 
female-coded or gender-neutral areas.
5
 Barber and Odean (2001) found males to be 
overconfident in another male-coded domain, i.e., stock trading. Bengtson et al. (2005) 
studied overconfidence among students and found males, especially young males, to be more 
overconfident than their female counterparts about their exam results. Previous literature on 
the relationship between age and overconfidence shows mixed results. Hansson et al. (2008) 
found evidence that age increases overconfidence in various judgment and decision-making 
tasks. Pliske and Mutter (1996) found the opposite, i.e., that age decreases overconfidence, 
while Bruine de Bruin et al. (2012) did not find any significant age effect at all.  
To summarize the main findings, we find that bureaucrats actually do not trust that the 
general public has sufficient knowledge to manage the fisheries, while the general public and 
recreational anglers generally trust that authorities have sufficient knowledge to do so. The 
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 Iceland, Greece, Spain, United Kingdom, and Faroe Islands. They particularly asked about trust in the science 
community regarding competence, common language, common vision, benevolence, receptivity, strong ties, 
integrity, predictability, and credibility. 
5
 The feminine task in the study by Beyer and Bowden (1997) was trivia about movies and TV-series targeted to 
women, and the gender neutral task was a test of common knowledge. Each task had 40 multiple choice 
questions. 
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commercial fishers, on the other hand, strongly distrust both the authorities and the general 
public. We also find that all respondents, regardless of which stakeholder group they belong 
to, are more likely to believe that they themselves are more knowledgeable than the general 
public. When looking at socio-economic variables, we find that, regardless of the comparison 
group, males have significantly higher self-trust than females, i.e., males to a larger extent 
than women tend to think they have more knowledge than others. Also, regardless of the 
comparison group, those with three years or more of university education believe they have 
more knowledge about fisheries management than the general public.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the 
sampling framework and how the data was collected. Section 3 presents the main research 
hypothesis, Section 4 is the result section, and Section 5 concludes the paper with a thorough 
discussion. 
 
2. Data collection methodology  
The data for this paper was collected using an additional module that followed a choice 
experiment survey concerning people’s willingness to pay for an increase in the abundance of 
coastal cod along the Swedish west coast. Samples were collected from four different 
populations: 1) the general public, 2) bureaucrats at three different agencies, i.e., the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), the County Administrative Board of Västra 
Götaland, the Water Protection Department (WPD), and the Swedish Agency for Marine and 
Water Management (SwAM), 3) recreational anglers, and 4) commercial fishers.  
Inshore coastal cod stocks along the Swedish west coast have been severely depleted 
since the 1970s and tests by research trawl vessels indicate that in 2008 the stock levels were 
only 2–3% of the levels in the 1970s. Marine researchers unanimously state overfishing by 
commercial and recreational fishers as the main reason for this development (Svedäng et al., 
2010; ICES, 2010) and that reaching a permanent increase in the coastal cod stock in Western 
Sweden would require a reduction of the current fishing pressure. However, fishers often 
stress small perturbations as important factors on future consequences and likely emphasize 
the importance of environment rather than realizing that a declining fish stock is the result of 
overfishing in previous years (Wilson and Pascoe, 2006). The decrease in the cod population 
has been intensively debated in the media for several years. In 2002, the Green Party made 
Baltic Sea cod stock recovery a major election issue in Sweden (Eggert and Olsson, 2009), 
and in 2014, WWF Sweden launched a campaign for a consumer boycott of Swedish shrimp 
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that received a lot of media attention. In addition, fishing in marine waters is open to all and 
more than 10 percent of the Swedes have engaged in recreational fishing (The Swedish 
Agency for Marine and Water Management, 2015). Hence, parts of the general public are 
fairly well informed about the state of the coastal cod stocks. However, overall the knowledge 
level about the coastal cod stock most likely varies across the four samples: Commercial 
fishers and bureaucrats working with fisheries probably have the most knowledge, while the 
general public likely has the least. The CE was designed to be completed by laypersons 
without a need for pre-existing knowledge about fisheries or fisheries management. All four 
respondent groups received the same baseline information about the situation for coastal cod 
along with a description of the attributes included in the CE. The trade-offs should therefore 
be a matter of preferences and taste. 
In the first section of the survey, respondents were shown a map with the coastline of 
interest in our study, followed by questions about the respondents’ location. In the second 
section, the respondents were provided information about the coastal cod stock and policy 
measures that could increase the cod stock. The second part also contained information about 
the attributes in the choice experiment (CE),
6
 an example of a choice set, the choice 
experiment itself, and finally the focus of this study: the trust questions. The third section 
contained questions to identify the respondents’ socioeconomic status.  
The choice experiment consisted of four attributes. The first attribute describes the size 
of the coastal cod stock, and the second describes the various fishing restrictions regarding 
when and where fishing is allowed: If the trawl boundary is moved further out from the coast, 
mostly commercial fishers are affected, while a complete fishing stop inside the existing trawl 
boundary would affect both commercial and non-commercial fishers, including recreational 
anglers. The third attribute describes two different cost principles to finance a cod stock 
enhancement .
7
 Finally, the last attribute is a cost that was framed as a monthly tax to finance 
measures to increase the coastal cod stock. Each choice set consisted of three alternatives: two 
improvement alternatives where the attribute levels were varied and one opt-out alternative 
where the attributes where kept constant at the current real world level (Appendix 1 provides 
an example of a choice set). In the CE, each respondent was asked to choose the alternative 
                                                          
6 In a choice experiment, individuals are given a hypothetical setting and asked to choose their preferred 
alternative among several alternatives in a choice set. The participants are usually asked to answer a sequence of 
such choice sets. Each alternative is described by a number of attributes. For overviews of the choice experiment 
method, see Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000) and Alpizar, Carlsson, and Martinsson (2003).  
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 The cost distribution attribute had two levels: i) everybody pays the same amount irrespective of income level 
and ii) everybody pays the same percentage of their income, so the amount increases with income. 
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they considered to be the best for fishery management in western Sweden. For the results of 
the CE part, see Eggert et al. (2016). 
In this paper we will focus on the part of the survey where respondents were asked 
whether they believed that they themselves, people in the general public, and bureaucrats 
working for environmental authorities have sufficient knowledge to answer the CE questions 
they had just answered. We consider beliefs about other people’s knowledge to be attitudes 
that can be identified as trust. Each respondent was asked the three ordinal scale questions as 
described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Main dependent variables: a) self-trust, b) general public trust and c) authority trust.  
a) Do you have sufficient knowledge to take a stance on the choices you were asked to 
make? 
 
b) Do people in general have sufficient knowledge to take a stance on the choices you were 
asked to make? 
 
c) Do officials at the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the County Administrative 
Board of Västra Götaland Unit of Water Management, and the Swedish Agency for Marine 
and Water Management have sufficient knowledge to take a stance on the choices you were 
asked to make? 
 
A 1–5 scale was used where 1 was “strongly disagree” and 5 “strongly agree.” For 
simplicity, we will define an average value of 2 and below as low trust and a value of 4 and 
above as high trust. A value between 2 and 4 will be defined as moderate trust. 
As mentioned above, the samples were collected from four different populations: the 
general public, bureaucrats at three different environmental agencies, recreational anglers, and 
commercial fishers. The general public and recreational anglers were recruited from the two 
adjacent Swedish counties Västra Götaland and Halland, to whom the Skagerrak and Kattegat 
straits are the natural references for issues relating to the sea. The subjects were reached using 
a random regional sample from the Citizen Panel at the University of Gothenburg, which 
consists of about 16,000 active participants who regularly contribute to Swedish and 
international survey research by answering web questionnaires that they receive through e-
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mail invitations. The panel members do not get paid for their participation. The population of 
recreational fishers included all registered members of the Swedish Anglers’ Association 
within the region of concern. Commercial fishers included all fishers with a homeport along 
the Swedish west coast. Finally, the bureaucrats were approached following approval by the 
respective agency management. The general public and the bureaucrats completed the survey 
online, while the recreational anglers and commercial fishers received their surveys by regular 
mail. The surveys were sent out from April to June 2014. For the general public, invitations 
were sent by email to 4,199 men and women 18–80 years old. Two reminders were also sent 
out, one and three weeks later. In total, 2,259 responses were received (54%). As some of the 
responses could not be used due to missing items, 2,248 responses were used in the final 
analysis. The mail survey to the Swedish Anglers’ Association was sent to 2,466 members, of 
whom 816 responded (33%). For the environmental bureaucrats, an e-mail with a link to the 
web questionnaire was sent out to 72 officials at the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water 
Management (SwAM), 49 at the County Administrative Board of Västra Götaland’s Water 
Protection Department (WPD), and 262 at the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
(SEPA). All in all, 164 useable responses were received from this group (43%). As for the 
commercial fishers, 649 individuals received the survey by mail and 74 (11%) of them 
provided useable answers. Obviously, the commercial fishers were very skeptical of our 
survey as about 30 of them personally called us and questioned the survey.  
 3. Hypotheses 
Many psychological studies find that people generally overestimate their own relative 
ability and are overly optimistic about the future. When respondents estimate their own 
position in a distribution of peers regarding traits such as driving ability, future income, and 
longevity, far more than 50% think they belong to the upper half. Connected to this, economic 
experiments indicate that overconfidence leads to excessive business entry (see Camerer and 
Lovallo, 1999, and references therein). Our main hypothesis is that people have a tendency to 
trust their own judgment more than the judgment of others. We test this hypothesis by 
comparing the subjects’ assessment of own judgment relative to others. In the over-
confidence literature, a person´s belief about own judgment to be better than others’ judgment 
is known as overplacement or illusionary superiority (Moore and Healy, 2008; Benoît and 
Dubra, 2011; Benoît, 2015).
8
 For example, if more than half of the population believes that 
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 That people think they are better than others is in the psychology literature called optimistic bias (van der Pligt, 
1996) and unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980). 
 9 
their judgment is better than half of the population, a bias is identified in the population. In 
our context, however, it is important to remember that the choices the subjects were asked to 
make were designed to be answered without any need for knowledge about fisheries or 
fisheries management. All respondents received the same information about current fishing 
restrictions and the current situation for the coastal cod stock. Hence, from the perspective of 
how the CE study was designed, the subjects should ideally strongly agree that they had 
sufficient knowledge to make the choices they were asked to make.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics based on the three different trust questions. Note 
that the three groups of bureaucrats are lumped into one group. Later on, we will look at 
possible differences between the three groups of bureaucrats.  
 
Table 2: Mean trust* (standard deviation in parentheses)  
 Stakeholders 
 General 
public 
(GP) 
Bureaucrats 
 
(B) 
 
Recreational 
anglers 
(RA) 
Commercial fishers 
(CF) 
Self-trust  2.52 (1.09) 
moderate 
2.86 (1.24) 
moderate 
3.51 (1.14) 
moderate 
4.55 (0.72) 
high 
General Trust 2.00 (0.86) 
low 
1.98 (0.88) 
low 
2.08 (0.91) 
moderate 
1.65 (1.03) 
low 
Authority Trust 3.81 (0.93) 
moderate 
3.56 (0.97) 
moderate 
3.75 (1.05) 
moderate 
1.92 (0.96) 
low 
Share of males 0.55 0.46 0.97  0.99 
Age 53.96 (13.99) 46.19 (9.60) 55.55 (14.05) 54.92 (13.88) 
University education, 
3 years or more 
0.49 0.96 0.27 0.03 
#Observations 2,248 164 816 74 
* Trust is measured on a scale from 1 to 5.  
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There are some interesting patterns in Table 2. For all stakeholder groups, we observe 
that self-trust is considerably higher than general trust, i.e., respondents believe that they are 
more knowledgeable than the general public when it comes to making choices regarding 
fisheries management. For all stakeholders except commercial fishers, we also observe a 
considerably high score for authority trust, i.e., stakeholders on average trust that bureaucrats 
working at environmental agencies have sufficient knowledge and the trust in bureaucrats is 
even higher than self-trust. On average, commercial fishers exhibit extremely high self-trust, 
while their trust in bureaucrats and in the general public is very low. The mean values also 
show that bureaucrats have low trust regarding the general public´s likelihood of having 
sufficient knowledge to make the choices about fisheries management that they were asked to 
make in the CE. On the other hand, for general trust, the bureaucrats’ mean value is in line 
with the mean values for the general public and recreational anglers. Another interesting 
result in Table 2 is that bureaucrats have more trust in their fellow bureaucrats than in 
themselves. We will explore these findings in more detail and also test for statistical 
significance in the next subsection.  
Our sample of the general public does have some overrepresentation in mean age, share 
of males, and education level (respondents with at least three years of university education).
9
 
We therefore estimated an OLS regression including these three overrepresented variables as 
independent variables to see whether they significantly affect the stated trust levels and 
subsequently we corrected for overrepresentation by predicting trust based on the regression 
model using the population means of the independent variables (OLS results are shown in 
Table A2 in the Appendix). We find that being a male significantly increases self-trust and 
general trust but decreases authority trust. University education significantly increases self-
trust and authority trust, while the level of general trust decreases with education. Finally, 
age has significant and negative effect on authority trust only. Importantly, the corrected 
mean values turn out to be basically the same for all trust variables compared with the results 
in Table 2 (see Table A2 for details).  
 
4.2 Inferential statistics 
Do people tend to trust their own judgment more than the judgments of others? We study this 
by statistically testing for differences between self-trust and general trust. Hence, relative 
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 The share of males is 55% in our sample but 50.5% in the whole population (Statistics Sweden, 2015a). The 
share of university educated is 49% while the population value is 20% (Statistics Sweden, 2015b). The mean age 
in our sample is 54 years while the population mean is 47 years (Statistics Sweden, 2015c).  
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trust = self-trust – general trust, and the interpretation is that superior trust is observed if 
relative trust > 0. Similarly, a negative difference will be labeled inferior (relative) trust. The 
top four panels in Figure 1 show the distribution of the relative trust variable. The very left 
panel is for the general public (GP), followed by bureaucrats (B), recreational anglers (RA), 
and commercial fishers (CF). To contrast these findings, the bottom four panels show 
distribution of a variable that is generated by taking the difference between self-trust and 
authority trust, which also forms a version of relative trust. Again, superior trust is observed if 
self-trust – authority trust > 0 and inferior trust is observed if self-trust – authority trust < 0.  
 12 
Figure 1: Distribution of relative trust 
 
Top four panels: General public: superior trust 42%, inferior trust 7%. Bureaucrats: superior trust 57%, inferior 
trust 2%. Recreational anglers: superior trust 77%, inferior trust 2%. Commercial fishers: superior trust 91%, 
inferior trust 1%.  
Bottom four panels: General public: superior trust 7%, inferior trust 57%.  Bureaucrats: superior trust 10%, 
inferior trust 52%. Recreational anglers: superior trust 24%, inferior trust 46%. Commercial fishers: superior 
trust 93%, inferior trust 0%.  
 
In Figure 1 we see that all of the top four panels show right-skewed distributions in line with 
superior trust, i.e., all four groups believe that they have more knowledge to answer the CE 
than people in general. The bottom four panels give a more mixed impression: The left 
skewness of the general public indicates that people in the general public have inferior 
relative trust compared with bureaucrats, and interestingly we find that bureaucrats also have 
inferior relative trust and believe other bureaucrats to be more knowledgeable. We will look at 
this phenomenon in more detail when analyzing heterogeneity among bureaucrats. The 
commercial fishers clearly deviate; none of them believe that bureaucrats have better 
knowledge to answer the CE than any of them. To formally test the relative trust hypothesis, 
we test whether H0: relative trust = 0 can be rejected, which if so would support the superior 
or inferior trust hypotheses. The results are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Testing for relative trust (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two sided)  
 Stakeholders 
Confidence General 
public 
(GP) 
Bureaucrats 
 
(B) 
Recreational 
anglers 
(RA) 
Commercial  
fishers 
(CF) 
Self-Trust - General 
Trust 
0.52*** 0.88*** 1.44*** 2.91*** 
Self-Trust – Authority 
Trust 
-1.29*** -0.70*** -0.24*** 2.64*** 
#Obs. 2,248 164 816 74 
 
Table 3 reveals that the respondents do show superior relative trust and there is a 
tendency to believe that one’s own judgment is better than the general public’s judgment. In 
relation to the authorities, we find that the general public and recreational anglers, but also the 
environmental bureaucrats, display inferior trust. Again the commercial fishers clearly 
diverge from the other respondents. They show very high self-trust but low trust in both the 
authorities and the general public. This may be a typical result for countries with traditionally 
regulated fisheries, like Sweden, where the authority base decisions on biological advice 
while almost all fishers lack property rights and thereby long-term investment incentives in 
stocks. Fishers tend to distrust biologists, who in their view do not understand fluctuations 
and spatial movements of fish stocks (see, e.g., Raakjaer, 2003; Pálsson, 1995), and they are 
likely not to heed scientific advice until they gain control over the means of production (Scott, 
1989; Christy, 1996). Also note that although we observe superior trust in the general public 
sample, we cannot confirm that superiority in trust is illusionary (biased) since less than 50% 
of the subjects exhibit it (see Figure 1). This means that we cannot ignore the possibility that 
the 40% who believe that they are more knowledgeable than others also belong to those who 
in fact are more knowledgeable.  
Finally, as discussed earlier, our general public sample does have some 
overrepresentation in mean age, share of males, and education level (respondents with at least 
three years of university education). We therefore estimated an OLS regression with relative 
trust as dependent variable and the three overrepresented variables as independent variables. 
We then used the population means of the independent variables to correct the 
 14 
overrepresentations. (OLS results are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix). Overall, this 
exercise confirms the conclusion from Table 3.
10
  
 
4.2.1 Regression analysis 
In this subsection we analyze relative trust using regressions that allow us to control for socio-
economic characteristics. A seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is estimated with the two 
dependent variables 𝑦1 = 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 −  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡, and 𝑦2 = 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 −
 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡, where the regression equations are linked by the fact that their error terms 
could be correlated (Wooldridge, 2010). In model 1 we include observations from all samples. 
In model 2 we only include the two samples general public and bureaucrats. The reason for 
this is that we want to control for gender and the samples for recreational anglers and 
commercial fishers consist of almost only males. Finally, in model 3 we focus on only 
bureaucrats and control for observed heterogeneity based on which agency the bureaucrats 
work at.  
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 For the general public and recreational anglers samples, the respondents were asked to answer the CE in one of 
the two different roles (as a private person or a bureaucrat) using a between-subject design. The results in Table 
3 remain basically the same whether we analyze the data separately for the two roles or jointly using the entire 
sample. 
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Table 4: Seemingly unrelated regression analysis for the dependent variables:  
y1 = Self_Trust – General_Trust and 
y2 = Self_Trust – Authority_Trust  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
𝑦1    
Male - 0.254*** 
(0.0380) 
0.417*** 
(0.157) 
Age -0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
University education 0.177*** 
(0.038) 
0.238*** 
(0.0398) 
- 
General public Ref. Ref. - 
Bureaucrats 
SEPA 
WPD 
SwAM 
0.266*** 
(0.084) 
- 
- 
- 
0.275*** 
(0.078)- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Ref. 
0.317 
(0.211) 
0.517*** 
(0.191) 
Recreational anglers 0.961*** 
(0.042) 
- - 
Commercial fishers 2.473*** 
(0.121) 
- - 
Constant 0.559*** 
(0.078) 
0.237*** 
(0.087) 
1.000** 
R2 0.21 0.04 0.11 
𝑦2    
Male - 0.485*** 
(0.052) 
0.856*** 
(0.178) 
Age 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
University education 0.0001 
(0.050) 
0.020 
(0.054) 
- 
General Public Ref. -  
Bureaucrats 
SEPA 
WPD 
SWAM 
 
0.616*** 
(0.109) 
- 
- 
- 
0.666*** 
(0.106)- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Ref. 
0.262 
(0.239) 
0.286 
(0.217) 
Recreational anglers  1.046*** 
(0.055) 
- - 
Commercial fishers 3.921*** 
(0.157) 
- - 
Constant -1.419*** 
(0.102) 
-1.882*** 
(0.119) 
-1.145** 
(0.465) 
Rho 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 
R2 0.22 0.05 0.15 
#Obs 3,303 2,412 164 
Sample GP,B,RA,CF GP,B B 
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management 
(SwAM), County Administrative Board of Västra Götaland’s Unit of Water Management (WDP) 
 
Starting with model 1, we see that the intercept for the first equation is positive and 
significant. This confirms the superior relative trust we discussed earlier. We also see that a 
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respondent with at least three years of university education has higher trust in their own 
knowledge than in others’ knowledge, i.e., superior relative trust increases with education. 
The negative and significant coefficient for age implies that superior relative trust goes down 
with age. Finally, we observe that superior relative trust is greater for bureaucrats, recreational 
anglers, and commercial fishers than for the general public.  
Continuing with the second regression equation in the model 1, we see that the 
intercept is negative, which is in line with our earlier findings that the general public displays 
inferior relative trust relative to authorities. Moreover, we see that the inferior relative trust is 
of lower strength for bureaucrats and recreational anglers than for commercial fishers, who 
instead show superior relative trust in relation to the authorities.  
Continuing with model 2, we see a positive and significant coefficient for males in 
both regressions, implying that males have both a higher level of superior relative trust and a 
lower level of inferior relative trust than females. Since males are clearly overrepresented in 
fishing, our results could be in line with other studies that found that males are overconfident 
in tasks that are traditionally seen as more masculine (Beyer and Bowden, 1997; Barber and 
Odean, 2001).  
In model 3 we control for observed heterogeneity among bureaucrats based on which 
agency they work for. The significant value 0.517 indicates that bureaucrats at SwAM, which 
is the government agency that deals inter alia with fisheries management in Sweden, show 
more superior relative trust than do bureaucrats at SEPA, who are more specialized in 
terrestrial challenges. WPD deals with water management but to a very limited degree with 
fisheries management, and we did not find that they differ significantly from SEPA. In the 
second equation of model 3, the negative intercept implies that bureaucrats believe that other 
bureaucrats are more knowledgeable than them. Interestingly, this inferior relative trust 
among individual bureaucrats is not found to differ across the agencies. In some sense, this 
result shares some common features with the well-known Dunning-Kruger effect and what 
they refer to as “the burden of expertise” (Kruger and Dunning, 1999; Dunning et al., 2003), 
i.e., that people who are very able tend to underestimate their rank relative to others with 
whom they compare themselves. Hence, they overestimate other people’s abilities while they 
actually have a good awareness of their own abilities. Finally, the previous result that males 
have superior relative trust is confirmed in both regressions. Moreover, compared to model 2, 
the male coefficients are larger in model 3 where we only include bureaucrats. Thus, male 
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bureaucrats have clearly a higher level of superior relative trust as well as a lower level of 
inferior relative trust than female bureaucrats.
11
 
 
5. Concluding discussion 
Politicians and public authorities have the challenging task of balancing the different interests 
in a society, which involves difficult trade-offs on a daily basis. In for example fisheries, the 
interests of recreational anglers can clash with those of commercial fishers, which in turn can 
be in conflict with the interests of the general public. Trust in public authorities, or 
institutional trust, is important as it can increase compliance by for example making more 
fishers accept regulations. With no or poor trust in authorities, there is a risk that fishers only 
believe in their own experiences concerning fishing. But institutional trust is not one-sided. It 
requires reciprocal efforts from the authorities and must be established together with both 
fishers and other citizens. Institutional trust can fall short due to uncertainty about whether 
bureaucrats act in their own self-interest or in the interest of the public they represent. To 
build the two-sided trust, the authorities have to allow some level of public influence in 
environmental policy and decision making and incorporate values held by the community. But 
this requires that the bureaucrats trust that the citizens they represent are sufficiently 
knowledgeable to participate.  
In this study we study trust among relevant authorities and other stakeholder groups 
regarding decisions about coastal cod stocks. On the one hand, we find that the general public 
as well as recreational anglers do trust the authorities to have sufficient knowledge to make 
decisions about fisheries management. On the other hand commercial fishers show no trust in 
the general public or in authorities. Hence, one of the main lessons learned from this study is 
that there is a need to improve the trust between authorities involved in fisheries management 
and commercial fishers. Moreover, environmental bureaucrats show little trust in the general 
public. This indicates a potential risk that Swedish authorities are less willing to involve the 
general public in environmental decision making. We also found that people in the general 
public tend to believe they are more knowledgeable than other non-experts. However, we 
could not confirm whether this superiority in relative trust is illusionary. Interestingly, while 
bureaucrats distrust the general public, individual bureaucrats tend to believe they are 
significantly less knowledgeable than other bureaucrats. In a sense, this result shares some 
                                                          
11
 The university education variable is not included in model 3 since almost all (96%) of the bureaucrats have at 
least three years of university education.  
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common features with the Dunning-Kruger effect (e.g., Dunning et al., 2003), which holds 
that highly able people tend to have a good self-awareness while they overestimate other 
people’s abilities. 
When looking at observable characteristics, we find that males have higher trust in their 
own knowledge than in the knowledge of people in general. In addition, males display a lower 
level of inferior trust in relation to authorities than women do. Both these results are strongest 
among male bureaucrats. Those with at least three years of university education (the typical 
time required to obtain a Bachelor’s degree in Sweden) to a larger extent than others believe 
they have more knowledge than the general public, i.e., superior relative trust increases with a 
university degree.  
In this paper we study beliefs about own and other people’s knowledge. Our results 
show that recreational and commercial fishers agree or even strongly agree that they have 
sufficient knowledge to take a stance regarding choices for fisheries management. Since the 
mean trust values of the environmental bureaucrats and the general public were below 3 (in 
the scale of 5), we conclude that bureaucrats and the general public to a lesser extent agree 
that they have sufficient knowledge. This is not in line with our prior beliefs. In this sense, our 
prior beliefs about how respondents would experience our CE were clearly also biased: The 
CE seems to be perceived as more difficult than stated in the feedback we received when 
preparing the survey design using focus groups and pilot studies. It would be interesting to see 
whether or not this finding is representative for other CE surveys. Moreover, the response rate 
of commercial fishers is low in our study. It is possible that those who answered our survey 
had lower trust and were more negative regarding how the fisheries management is handled in 
Sweden compared with those in this group who did not answer. If so, our results for 
commercial fishers might exaggerate the distrust among commercial fishers. On the other 
hand, our results are well in line with the results by Rova (2004), who found that fishers to a 
greater extent tend to respect and follow their own self-imposed rules than rules handed down 
by authorities. Glenn et al. (2012) also found that, among all stakeholder groups included in 
their study, commercial fishers had the highest level of distrust in the fisheries science 
community. Regardless, as always with empirical studies, replication is the way forward to 
gain more and precise knowledge.  
How can the vicious circle of potentially biased beliefs and distrust among authorities 
and other stakeholders be broken? Although our research does not address this question, we 
believe that open communication, citizen juries, and other participatory tools could be one 
way forward. It remains, however, a venue for future research.  
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Appendix 1 
Table A1. Example of a choice set 
Exchange rate euro 1 = SEK 9.20 (April–June, 2014) 
 
 
Table A2. OLS regressions for the general public and prediction of adjusted trust 
Variable Self-trust General trust Authority trust 
Male 0.358*** 
(0.046) 
0.119*** 
(0.037) 
-0.099** 
(0.039) 
University education > 3 
years 
0.148*** 
(0.047) 
-0.094** 
(0.037) 
0.127*** 
(0.040) 
Age 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
Constant 2.153*** 
(0.104) 
1.938*** 
(0.083) 
4.035*** 
(0.089) 
No. of observations 2,248 2,248 2,248 
 Adjusted Predicted 
Self Trust 
= 2.45  
Adjusted Predicted 
General Trust 
= 2.02 
Adjusted Predicted 
Authority Trust 
= 3.81 
 
 Alternative 1 
(Situation today) 
Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
Size of the coastal cod 
stock: amount of at least 5 
year old cod caught per 
trawl hour 
About 2 kg  About 50 kg  About 25 kg  
Restrictions regarding 
when and where fishing is 
allowed 
Like today 
No fishing at all for 
cod inside the existing 
trawl boundary  
The trawl boundary is moved 3.7 
km further out from the coast. 
Inside the boundary, trawl fishing is 
prohibited. 
Your tax increase per 
month (year) the next 10 
years 
SEK 0  
 
SEK 200 (SEK 2,400) 
 
 
SEK 100 (SEK 1,200) 
 
Cost sharing principle to 
finance cod stock 
enhancement  
 
Everybody pays the 
same amount, 
irrespective of income 
level. 
Everybody pays the same 
percentage of their income; amount 
increases with income 
Mark the alternative you 
prefer (X) 
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Table A3. OLS regressions for the general public and prediction of adjusted relative trust 
Variable Self-Trust – General Trust General Trust – Authority Trust 
Male 0.239 *** 
(0.039) 
0.456*** 
(0.054) 
University education > 3 years 0.242*** 
(0.040) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Age 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.021 
(0.055) 
Constant 0.215** 
(0.104) 
-1.883*** 
(0.123) 
No. of observations 2,248 2,248 
 Adjusted Predicted Relative Trust 
= 0.43***  
Adjusted Predicted Relative Trust 
= -1.36*** 
 
